The Chinese government rules Tibet through administration of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and 12 Tibetan autonomous prefectures or counties in the nearby provinces of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu, and Yunnan. Under the Chinese constitution, autonomous areas have the right to formulate their own regulations and implement national legislation in accordance with local conditions. In practice, however, decision-making authority is concentrated in the hands of unelected ethnic (Han) Chinese officials of the CCP, which has a monopoly on political power. Wang Junzheng, former deputy party secretary and chief security officer in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), was appointed to replace Wu Yingjie as TAR party secretary in October 2021, raising grave concerns that the leadership was planning to expand the draconian policies it had adopted in the XUAR to the TAR.

The few ethnic Tibetans who occupy senior executive positions serve mostly as figureheads or echo official doctrine. In October 2021, Yan Jinhai, an ethnic Tibetan official who had most recently served as the Lhasa party secretary, was chosen as chairman (governor) of the TAR. The TAR chairman is formally elected by the regional people’s congress, but in practice such decisions are predetermined by the CCP leadership.

The regional people’s congress of the TAR, which is formally elected by lower-level people’s congresses, chooses delegates to China’s 3,000-member National People’s Congress (NPC) every five years. In practice, all candidates are vetted by the CCP. The CCP’s 20th party congress in October 2022 resulted in a reshuffle of the TAR’s top leadership positions.

As in the rest of China, direct elections are only permitted at the lowest administrative levels. Tight political controls and aggressive state interference ensure that competitive races with independent candidates are even rarer in Tibet than in other parts of the country. Restrictions for village elections exclude candidates who have attended religious teachings abroad, have communicated with overseas Tibetans, or have relatives studying at monasteries outside China.

All organized political activity outside the CCP is illegal and harshly punished, as is any evidence of loyalty to or communication with the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA)—a representative body based in Dharamsala, India, that is often referred to as a government-in-exile.

The CTA includes an elected parliament serving five-year terms, a Supreme Justice Commission that adjudicates civil disputes, and a directly elected prime minister, also serving five-year terms. Votes are collected from the Tibetan diaspora around the world. The unelected Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader who also traditionally served as head of state, renounced his political role in 2011. In May 2021, Penpa Tsering was elected as prime minister of the CTA, replacing Lobsang Sangay, who stepped down after serving two terms.

As in China as a whole, the one-party system structurally precludes and rigorously suppresses the development of any organized political opposition. Tibet has never experienced a peaceful and democratic transfer of power between rival groups.

The authoritarian CCP is not accountable to voters and denies the public any meaningful influence or independent participation in political affairs.

Political opportunities for ethnic Tibetans within Tibet remain limited. Ethnic Chinese officials dominate top-level and strategic positions in the CCP and government, while ethnic Tibetans are restricted to lower-level and rubber-stamp positions. The authorities vigorously suppress and harshly punish any independent political or civic engagement by ethnic Tibetans, even on local community issues that were considered less politically sensitive in previous decades.

Women are well represented in many public sector jobs and CCP posts within the TAR, though most high-level officials are men, and women are unable to organize independently to advance their political interests.

As elsewhere in China, unelected CCP officials determine and implement government policies in Tibet. Constitutionally, the TAR, like other ethnic minority regions, should enjoy greater autonomy than other provinces, but in practice it is controlled even more tightly by the central government. CCP entities—like the United Front Work Department—are explicitly in charge of policy areas including religious affairs and ethnic minorities, which are especially relevant for Tibet.

Corruption is believed to be extensive, as it is in China more generally, though little information is available on the scale of the problem.

There have been moves in recent years to curb graft among the region’s officials as part of Chinese president Xi Jinping’s nationwide anticorruption campaign. However, many prosecutions are believed to be politically selective or amount to reprisals for perceived political and religious disloyalty. Efforts to control corruption are monopolized by the CCP leadership; as elsewhere in China, citizens who seek to expose official misdeeds in Tibet have faced detention and prosecution.

Governance is opaque in all of China but even more so in Tibet, where the CCP’s policies and decision-making are rarely if ever public knowledge.

CCP authorities control traditional and social media in Tibet even more strictly than in Han Chinese areas of the country. Individuals who use the internet, social media, or other means to share politically sensitive news content or commentary face arrest and heavy criminal penalties.

Deliberate internet blackouts occur periodically in Tibet, including in areas where public demonstrations or natural disasters have occurred. International broadcasts are jammed, and personal communication devices are confiscated and searched. The online censorship and monitoring systems in place across China are applied more stringently in the TAR, while censorship of Tibet-related keywords on the popular messaging application WeChat has become more sophisticated. Authorities have prohibited the use of Tibetan language on a widening array of social media apps, particularly ones that use streaming and live communication services.

The TAR is the only provincial-level region of China that requires foreigners to obtain a special permit to enter, and foreign journalists are regularly prevented from visiting. Journalists also face barriers in access to Tibetan areas of Sichuan and other provinces, though no permission is officially required to travel to those places. Tibetans who communicate with foreign media or other foreign contacts without permission face criminal prosecution and long prison sentences. Sharing local information online can also lead to punishment. In January 2022, many people were detained and charged with possessing and revealing “state secrets” for sharing photos of the destruction of a 99-foot tall Tibetan Buddhist statue in Drago County.

Religious practice is carefully managed and increasingly restricted in Tibet. Chinese authorities view Tibetan reverence for the Dalai Lama and adherence to the region’s unique form of Buddhism as a threat to CCP rule. Tibetan Buddhist clergy and lay believers are forced to denounce the Dalai Lama, pledge their loyalty to the CCP and socialism above their religious beliefs, and attend increasingly long political education sessions. People who possess Dalai Lama–related materials, especially in the TAR, are routinely detained and at times criminally prosecuted.

Political and ideological indoctrination within monasteries and nunneries intensified in 2022, with monks and nuns subjected to invasive and onerous supervision. “Management committees,” made up of CCP cadres and the police, exercise broad authority to directly control the daily operations of religious communities. “Intelligent temple management” systems operate in nearly all religious institutions, including pervasive video surveillance in all temples and monasteries. In February 2022, the first police surveillance unit inside a Tibetan monastery—the Palyul Thartang Gonchen Monastery in Qinghai Province’s Golog Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture—was established, giving police unprecedented ability to monitor all monastery activities.

Authorities continued to use the coronavirus pandemic as a pretext to shut down monasteries and nunneries and to restrict hours for worship in many temples throughout the year. Anyone under the age of 18 is prohibited from becoming a monk or a nun, and religious education for children is prohibited. A law enacted in March 2022 in China, the “Measures for the Administration of Internet Religious Information Services,” prohibits any individual or group from posting religious content online without a special license.

In May 2022, authorities launched the “Three Consciousness” campaign, forcing nuns and monks to attend re-education classes during which they are required to condemn specific Tibetan religious and cultural beliefs and practices. These practices include Tsethar or “merit release,” the Buddhist practice of releasing animals destined for slaughter, and Saka Dawa fasting, the feast that celebrates the birth, enlightenment, and death of the Buddha. They were further required to denounce the Tibetan farmers’ strikes and other nonviolent protests.

The Chinese government has asserted its intention to select the successor of the current Dalai Lama, who turned 87 in July 2022, and has intervened into Tibetan tradition by appointing their own Panchen Lama, a religious figure who plays an important role in identifying the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, according to Tibetan Buddhist rituals. The location of the Panchen Lama, who was originally recognized by the current Dalai Lama, remains unknown; he was abducted by Chinese officials in 1995 when he was six years old.

University professors cannot lecture on certain topics, and many must attend political indoctrination sessions. The government restricts course materials to prevent circulation of unofficial versions of Tibetan history and has phased out the use of Tibetan as the language of instruction in schools over the past decade. Nearly all Tibetan students returning to the classroom in 2022 had all their subject matters, except for Tibetan language, taught in Mandarin. Private and monastery schools have been largely shut down in recent years in an effort to force students into government-run schools—many of them boarding schools—where Mandarin is the only language of instruction.

Freedom of expression, including in private, is severely limited by factors including authorities’ monitoring of electronic communications, a heavy security presence, recruitment of informants, regular ideological campaigns in Tibetan areas, and harsh punishments for those who post on sensitive subjects. The authorities in Tibet make use of an invasive security and censorship system that features nearly ubiquitous video cameras, use of facial-recognition technology, “smart” identity cards, and integrated surveillance systems that allow tracking of residents and tourists in real time. Hundreds of “security centers” operate across the region, with more than 130 in Lhasa alone.

Tibetans are regularly detained or sentenced to prison for verbally expressing support for or sharing images of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan independence, sending information abroad about self-immolation protests or the destruction of Buddhist temples and statues, or engaging in other forms of Tibetan cultural expression.

In May 2022, the TAR Cyberspace Administration announced new policies targeting online live broadcasting and short videos in the region to confront unspecified “social threats.” The policies are reportedly broad and vague, allowing authorities to further repress dissent.

Chinese authorities severely restrict freedom of assembly as part of the government’s intensified “stability maintenance” policies in Tibet. Control and surveillance of public gatherings extend beyond major towns to villages and rural areas. Even nonviolent protesters are rapidly and often violently dispersed and harshly punished. Despite the restrictions, Tibetans continue to express their views on government policies through sporadic solitary or small-scale protests in public places, though they are usually immediately seized by police.

The number of self-immolations, typically intended to protest CCP rule, has declined sharply in the last few years due to information blackouts, heightened security and surveillance, and harsh punishments of those associated with self-immolators. Engaging in self-immolation and organizing, assisting, or gathering crowds related to such acts are considered criminal offenses.

Rare protests were reported in October 2022, when hundreds marched in the street to protest harsh Zero-COVID measures imposed by Beijing, although most participants were reportedly Han Chinese demanding to be allowed to leave the TAR.

Tibetans are unable to establish and operate nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) without facing punishment by the authorities. Even seemingly apolitical social and community engagement is not tolerated. Foreign NGOs are generally not allowed to operate in Tibet.

Independent trade unions are illegal in Tibet, as they are in China as a whole. The only legal union organization is the government-controlled All-China Federation of Trade Unions, which has long been criticized for failing to properly defend workers’ rights. Labor activism in Tibet is riskier and therefore much rarer than in other parts of China. According to the NGO China Labour Bulletin, no strikes were documented in the TAR during 2022.

The CCP controls the judicial system, and courts consequently lack independence. Courts at all levels are supervised by party political-legal committees that influence the appointment of judges, court operations, and verdicts and sentences. Given the political sensitivity of Tibetan issues, the scope for autonomous judicial decision-making in Tibetan areas is even more limited than elsewhere in China.

Tibetans are systematically denied due process in criminal matters. Among other abuses, they are subjected to arbitrary arrest, denial of family visits, long periods of enforced disappearance, solitary confinement, and illegal pretrial detention. Authorities often fail to inform families of the detention, whereabouts, and well-being of loved ones and threaten them with punishment for revealing information. Tibetans have even less access to legal representation of their choice than Han Chinese; lawyers seeking to defend them are routinely harassed, denied access to their clients, blocked from attending relevant hearings, and in some cases disbarred in retaliation. Trials are closed if state security interests are invoked, which sometimes occurs even when no political crime is listed.

As of May 2021, the US State Department estimated that there were between 500 and 2,000 political prisoners in Tibet.

Detained suspects and prisoners are subject to torture and other forms of ill-treatment. Many Tibetan prisoners of conscience die in custody under circumstances indicating torture, and others are released with severe injuries and in extremely poor health, apparently to avoid deaths in custody. Many of the latter subsequently succumb to their injuries. Five Tibetans, identified as Chugdhar, Ghelo, Tsedo, Bhamo and Kori, are reported to have been tortured after being detained for lighting incense and praying for the long life of the Dalai Lama in August 2022 in Seda County, Sichuan Province. One of them, Chugdhar, reportedly died from his injuries.

Ethnic Tibetans face a range of socioeconomic disadvantages and discriminatory treatment by employers, law enforcement agencies, and other official bodies. The dominant role of the Chinese language in education and employment limits opportunities for many rural Tibetans, 80 percent of whom have no or limited Mandarin-language skills. Increased Mandarin language testing for employment has disadvantaged ethnic Tibetans seeking permanent jobs in more lucrative positions. While Tibetans are supposed to receive preferential treatment in university admission examinations, Tibetan students often face insurmountable obstacles to gain admission to top-tier national-level secondary schools. Tibetans who apply for public-sector jobs—including cleaners and other low-level staff—are required to denounce the Dalai Lama, renounce their religious beliefs, and demonstrate their political loyalty in other ways that fundamentally negate their ethnic and cultural identity.

As in the rest of China, gender bias against women remains widespread, despite laws barring workplace discrimination. LGBT+ people suffer from discrimination, though same-sex sexual activity is not criminalized. Social pressures discourage discussion of LGBT+ issues.

The TAR features extreme restrictions on freedom of movement that disproportionately affect ethnic Tibetans. Obstacles including troop deployments, checkpoints, roadblocks, required bureaucratic approvals, and passport restrictions impede freedom of movement both within Tibetan areas—especially the TAR—and between those areas and the outside world. The more than 2,000 “inspectors” that staff around 700 “discipline committees” set up in recent years in rural Tibetan communities have imposed tighter travel restrictions, with Tibetans needing permits to enter certain areas, particularly near international borders in the south.

While Han Chinese tourists have been encouraged to visit the TAR, the movements of foreign tourists, journalists, diplomats, and others are tightly controlled, and they are often denied entry. Tibetans face nearly insurmountable hurdles in obtaining a passport for foreign travel, and foreign nationals of Tibetan origin face enormous challenges when seeking a visa to visit Tibet, in some cases waiting for years only for their request to be denied.

Increased security efforts and Nepalese government cooperation have made it difficult for Tibetans to cross the border into Nepal. Some Tibetan pilgrims who travel abroad face detention upon return to China.

The Chinese government used its Zero-COVID policy to further its repressive campaign on Tibetans. COVID-19 outbreaks during the year reportedly led to the mass transfers of thousands of people to overcrowded and unsanitary isolation centers, where detainees reported lacking access to food and medical treatment and where individuals who tested positive for the virus were housed with individuals who tested negative. Many were reported to have died from lack of medical attention or lack of food.

The economy is dominated by state-owned enterprises and private businesses with informal ties to officials. Tibetans reportedly find it more difficult than ethnic Chinese residents to obtain permits and loans to open businesses, and Tibetan-owned businesses are often arbitrarily shut down. Numerous Tibetan tour guides were detained in 2022, forced to pay fines, and told to shut down their business.

The multiyear policy of forcing Tibetans off their rural land and into the urban wage economy has given the state additional leverage over a growing proportion of the population, as those affected lose their self-reliance and increasingly depend on market wages and government subsidies for their income.

The central government further loosened family planning regulations nationwide in 2021, allowing all families to have up to three children—after having ended the long-standing one-child policy in 2016 by allowing couples to have up to two children. While the change means a likely decrease in the number of people who experience punitive aspects of the system, such as high fines, job dismissal, reduced government benefits, and detention, the authorities continue to regulate reproduction, and related abuses and punishments are occasionally reported.

In the past, China’s family-planning policies were formally more lenient for Tibetans and members of other ethnic minority groups. Officials limited urban Tibetans to two children and encouraged rural Tibetans to stop at three, at a time when Han Chinese couples were limited to one child. As a result, the TAR is one of the few areas of China without a skewed sex ratio.

State policies that actively encourage interethnic marriages with financial and other incentives, and that require couples to designate a single ethnicity for their children, are among the ongoing policies that have reduced the ethnic Tibetan share of the TAR’s population. Tibetan women are vulnerable to human trafficking schemes that result in forced marriage.

Exploitative employment practices are pervasive in many industries, as is the case across China, though ethnic Tibetans report additional disadvantages in hiring and compensation. Human trafficking that targets Tibetan women can lead to forced prostitution or exploitative employment in domestic service and other economic sectors elsewhere in China. The herders, farmers, and other Tibetans who are forced off their rural land and resettled in towns and cities are extremely vulnerable to exploitation by public and private employers alike. Recent increases in Mandarin language requirements and testing for employment discriminate against ethnic Tibetans.